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A Tale of Two Geniuses-with Opposing Views
of Tales-and an Ingenious Critic of Both: H.C.
Andersen, S0ren Kierkegaard, and Georg
Brandes
by Poul Houe
I
The year 2005 marks the 200 th anniversary of Hans Christian
Andersen's birth and the 150 th anniversary of S0ren Kierkegaard's
death. Kierkegaard's critique of Andersen as a novelist was
merciless, and Andersen's relation to Kierkegaard the man and the
thinker was not easygoing either. Both of these towering nineteenth
century Golden Age Danes were first portrayed in a big way by the
same Danish critic, Georg Brandes, himself a pivotal figure in
nineteenth century European criticism. I thought it appropriate,
therefore, to focus my paper on Andersen, Kierkegaard, and Brandes
as three cornerstones of nineteenth century Danish culture.
More specifically, I wish to consider how their appropriation of
(fairy) tales-from different, if not opposing viewpoints-situates
this genre as a burning glass for three ingeniously powerful
aesthetic, intellectual, and existential worldviews.
What are
Andersen's and Kierkegaard's conflicting views of fairy tales, and
how are these views embedded in Brandes' s treatments of the two
authors? Has he cast either one or both of them in his own fairy tale
paradigm? And is there an over-arching fairy tale to be told that
encapsulates the entire trio in its "message"?
Why look to fairy tales for a common denominator for our three
writers? For one thing, they all looked to this genre themselves for a
better understanding of themselves-or of each other. And
secondly, this angle of incidence is particularly relevant today, when
fairy tales seem to enjoy a renaissance, 1 as they did in the Romantic
era, in which - and against which -Andersen and Kierkegaard
wrote their works, and to which even Brandes in many ways was
indebted.
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"That's what I like so much about fairy tales. Fairy tales contain a
lot of cruelty and suffering, but there's almost always a liberating
element at the end. Maybe that's the task of literature, I don't
know," says Annika Idstrom, a modem Finnish novelist. 2 Her words
speak for many contemporary writers at the same time as they
capture a shared endeavor behind the lives and works of Andersen,
Kierkegaard, and Brandes.
The question, however, is what
"liberating" means in each of these three cases.
II
It's no longer a matter of controversy that Andersen wrote his fairy
tales for children and adults, and did so in such a way that the child
per se would be liberated from adult repression while the child within
the adult would be stimulated in a deeper sense. 3 A shared humanity
would gather around Andersen's storytelling, and the sharp division
between righteous grown-ups and inferior little ones would
temporarily be dispensed with.
And not surprisingly so, for the adult Hans Christian Andersen
harbored a most vivid child within himself and refused to "grow
up" or be a "grown-up" at the expense of this priceless existential
and artistic resource at the bottom of his heart and soul. Human
spirit, by his experience and faith, was ultimately childlike, openminded, and open-ended. Hence, the fairy tale about the ugly
duckling that after going through so much suffering finally is
recognized as the beautiful swan it always had been inside, became
the foundational myth about Andersen's own life, thanks in part to
his biographers, in part to his own autobiographies. Georg Brandes,
for one, read Andersen's text as the expression "of the very essence
of its author's personal character." 4
Nevertheless, the tale is, and remains, a myth in the sense that it
seeks to apply the harmonious model of Bi/dung in nineteenth
century thinking and novels to a story about escape and flight that
doesn't end up reconciled with its point of departure, and that isn't
teleologically bound to affirm that the world is, after all, an orderly
cosmos. Indeed, reality is purely accidental; it just happens to be
part of the accident that it looks as though it were not an accident! 5
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Still, if the so-called duckling was born a swan, its recognition, by
itself and others, as the being it had been since birth, has the
character of a rebirth. And the desire, or the drive, towards this
rebirth is as fundamental as any archetypical or religious longing: a
bondage and a liberating force in one gesture, to refer once again to
Johan de Mylius, whom I cited before, and whose most recent book
concludes on the note that the drive in question is both personal and
artistic and thus unifies the author with his tales, or at least blurs the
boundary between fiction and person.6
One might say that Andersen's life was a tale insofar as he
invested himself in his fairy tale writing; but it was not the
sentimental tale he envisioned when, unbound by artistic strictures,
he portrayed himself as deserving of tenderness and pity, and even
superimposed this self-perception on his works of art.7
Presumably, the discrepancy between his genuine artistic tale(s)
about his own life, and his private sentimentalization of his life-its
predicaments as well as its good fortunes-is indicative of
Andersen's incomplete self-realization. If true fairy tales are
narratives about the corning into being of selfhood, then these
artistic tales also give authentic testimony to the actual shortcomings
of this process. Conversely, the sentimental tales constructed
outside artistic perimeters confirm said shortcomings by merely
postulating an accomplished integration.
Their inadvertent
contradictions evidence what their artistic counterparts deliberately
say about a conflict-ridden life.
III
If Andersen only gradually came to realize that his lasting fame as a
writer for better or worse rested upon his production of fairy tales,
S0ren Kierkegaard was always quite a "fairy tale freak." The
expression is coined by Jens Andersen, whose new and large Hans
Christian Andersen biography contains a rather satisfactory
account-to which I am beholden here-of the relation between the
two men and the difference between their fairy tale conceptions. 8
Kierkegaard's enduring critique of Andersen was initially aimed
at one of his novels, but it somewhat pertains to his fairy tales as
well. While the two authors shared-among other things-an
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interest in childhood and a delight in fairy tales, then precisely those
character traits I just mentioned as typical of the ugly duckling myth
appeared in Kierkegaard's spectacles to be those of a spineless,
wimpy, and unmanly individual named Hans Christian Andersen.
As someone thriving in head wind, Kierkegaard was contemptuous
of someone like Andersen who always pleaded for tail wind. From
Kierkegaard's standpoint, Andersen's was sorely lacking a coherent
worldview, or outlook, and so his fairy tales were nai:ve, and not at
all the rough-and-ready refreshments and stimulants for adults that
Kierkegaard preferred.
In short, it was the ambiguity, open-endedness, and
decenteredness in Andersen's personality and tales-the very
features that foregrounded modernism in this body of literaturethat so offended his philosophical counterpart and his demand for
existential responsibility and integrity. Of his attack on Andersen,
Kierkegaard himself said it was an effort "to vouchsafe Andersen's
clustered and motley poetic existence in all its curvings, twinings,
turnings, twistings, and grimacings." 9 He wanted to straighten out
the irregular poet.
In Kierkegaard's view, a disharmonious person like Andersen was
not the right one to tell fairy tales to children. For he was not an
adult who had a harmonious enough childhood behind him to tell
them about; rather, he was a childish individual whose stories
would but confuse and discourage children from fully growing up.
Children needed fairy tales to purify and work through the angst
that even they experienced as part of the human condition - an idea
much in the vein of Bruno Bettelheim' s later uses of fairy tale
enchantment, but quite at odds with everything Andersen stood for,
personally and artistically. And for all his astuteness, Kierkegaard
failed to appreciate Andersen's radical vitalization of the child, be it
within the adult or outside adult confines.
IV
Whereas Andersen called his principal autobiography The Fairy Tale
of My Life, and mythologized the role of his fairy tale heroes in order
to articulate his self-understanding, Kierkegaard viewed fairy tales
not as metaphors or symbols of his journey of life and work, but
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rather as insightful and illustrative companion pieces to his various
writings-and to the respective existential and religious stages he
went through and interpreted in the course of his journey.
Jens Andersen, in his outline of Kierkegaard's fairy tale
conception, seems to rely quite heavily on Grethe Kj~r's book from
1991 on the world of the fairy tale in Kierkegaard's oeuvre. Permit
me, in the following five paragraphs, to extract from her welldocumented discussion some of the most central observations and
conclusions. 10
When fairy tales were not simply being read for relaxation from
personal problems (16), Kierkegaard considered them, whether they
be folk tales or myths, as valuable expositions of life and existence
(20).
He compared them to "hypothetical sentences in the
indicative," grasping the eternal in temporal forms (18). He found
their irony of life positive, as opposed to the negative irony of the
Romantics (13-14)-and found their description of human
development as pertinent to the single individual as to human kind
as a whole. Historical periods with a dominant interest in myths
and tales must correspond to a time in a particular child's life when
a similar susceptibility prevails; indeed, Kierkegaard increasingly
turns from the ethnological study of tales and their role within
mankind's development in general to the relevance of this art form
for the single individual's development seen in the light of
psychology and from an ethico-religious standpoint (27-30, 109).
To the extent Kierkegaard distinguishes between myths and tales,
he finds the latter more universal, at once down to earth and
supernatural (34). Their world is an other world-to be taken
seriously (30) because tales may lead to individuation, or selfrealization, which in tum will enable the individual to choose itself
as the individual that God posited it to be (35, 36, 39). Again the
anthropological stages for human development reflect the individual
human being's search for selfhood (51), which in its deepest sense
means a movement of resignation from this world into a deeper
awareness of the eternal (56).
At this point Kierkegaard's philosophy of life collides with the
fairy tale's anthropology, for the self-realization afforded here is
insufficient compared to his demands. While the tale seeks justice
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and eternity by moving reality toward ideality, Kierkegaard's ethicoreligious move went in the opposite direction, so as to bring ideality
into the real world (82, 90). Humans are composite beings, and fairy
tales are important means to the end of realizing this fact as part of
the human condition; only through self-realization and the freedom
it entails, does angst, the reality of sin and of not always choosing
the good, come to mind (82).
Whenever Kierkegaard leaves the aesthetical for the religious
stage, fairy tales tend to recede from his discourse. They resonate
well with the Socratic notion of man's ability to find the truth within,
unlike man the sinner who is beholden to god's truth; but as god
enters time as truth, man is compelled to realize his or her own
untruth (85-86).
Even this transition calls for fairy tale
accompaniment, though, but now on Kierkegaard's own terms.
Hence the nexus between the god's entrance into the temporal and
man's actual angst about his precarious condition. Angst as spirit
bound in corporeal form holds the promise of both freedom and
perdition. But in order for it to bear on freedom and to fulfill its
spiritual promise, angst must be learned the right way, and fairy
tales leading the individual towards selfhood have-since the
Grimm Brothers - been considered roadmaps serving this retrograde
goal (93, 95, 96, 102).
There is no denying that Kierkegaard's use of fairy tales mirrors
his intellectual development overall. His reading of these tales in the
context of aesthetical-ethical concerns is clearly for selfidentification. Like Scheherezade, who kept herself alive by telling
stories to the sultan that were important to his life, Kierkegaard's
fairy tale connection hits both ways. It serves his reader with means
to identify his or her deeper self, while it saves Kierkegaard's own
life by committing him to his authorship (102, 104, 111-14). And like
Scheherezade, Kierkegaard at the religious stage enables his listener
and reader to give and receive love (114).
We began comparing Kierkegaard and Andersen with respect to
their notions of tales and the like; now, let's come full circle and
compare their Agnete and the Merman works to which both writers
have devoted serious attention. Andersen's drama by this name was
by far his most daring investment for the stage, and the female
208

protagonist named in its title was supposed to be his own inquiring
spirit. 11 Yet her indecisive male counterpart was precisely the
anathema Kierkegaard loathed in Andersen. The male and the
female were innocently, undramatically, and sentimentally
positioned on the same stem, like certain flowers .12
In Kierkegaard's, or his pseudonym Johannes de Silentio's,
merman (in Fear and Trembling), striving is resolutely directed
towards otherness, as the author preferred it. This Agnete is not
innocent, and when the merman approaches her humbly, to make
her save his soul, she rather reignites his passion; and never has it
raged so demonically as it does together with this supposedly saving
female grace. The merman signifies a human who cannot be saved
by another human, and he belongs to a traditional tale devoid of
remedies. Only through faith, by dint of the absurd, may he arrive
at a new beginning, a new innocence.
Agnete and the Merman may be the title of one of Kierkegaard's
better, and one of Andersen's worse, artistic products; yet
comparing the two is telling. It tells quite a bit about Andersen's
and Kierkegaard's understanding and approprition of tales, and
about the affinity between this genre and the two authors' respective
existential and authorial personas. And it draws a demarcation line
between them as adversarial administrators of the fairy tale corpus.
V

Georg Brandes' groundbreaking work on Andersen consists
primarily of three consecutive articles from 1869, followed by a
retrospective introduction to the so-called world edition of his tales
and stories from 1900, and by a shorter feature article on the
occasion of the 100 th anniversary of Andersen's birth (in 1905). The
entire material is collated by Elias Bredsdorff in his H.C. Andersen og
Georg Brandes (1994).13 Brandes's work on Kierkegaard, on the other
hand, is one seminal book, Seren Kierkegaard (1877), amended in 1880
with a postscript on Kierkegaard's posthumous papers. 14
In both instances, considerable admiration and rebuke have been
heaped on the author over time.
Controversy has always
surrounded Brandes' s activities, and arguments pro et contra the
man and his work have been leveled from various directions to this
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day. While I will not review this massive body of reactions here, it is
possible, I believe, to center the major criticisms against Brandes on
the fairy tale template that he encountered in Andersen and came to
apply broadly in his own criticism.
To illustrate the point, let me cite the final lines of a critical
revalution of the entire modem breakthrough ushered in by
Brandes. Taken from a plenary paper delivered by Sven H. Rossel
at a 1986 Gothenburg conference on "The Modem Breakthrough,"
the quote resonates with many a past and present criticism of
Brandes. "Georg Brandes," says Rossel, "sought to draw a picture of
himself as the grand lonesome intellectual, once again ahead of his
time and therefore once again misunderstood and persecuted -yet
another myth in the history of Brandesianism that awaits its
destruction." 15
Without deciding about the validity of the point made-it is
clearly polemical, but not without foundation in Brandes's
writings-it takes no rocket science to identify the nature of Rossel's
claim. He simply states that Brandes has employed the ugly
duckling myth to characterize his-Brandes's-own development.
Had he-Rossel-made the additional point (which he hasn't!) that
such a myth is marred with inner contradictions, he might have
substituted deconstruction for destruction ["aflivning"].
If Brandes, as many have argued, has molded a myth about
himself on a fairy tale template, his deception is not simply aimed at
typecasting a much more nuanced and contradictory reality in his
own favor; no, the range of his alleged misrepresentation is such that
even his critics have been misled by its mythical form to overlook
the mythical content. To prevent myths, which are not untruths but
partial truths, from perpetuating themselves, they must indeed be
deconstructed, not destructed.
Reading Rossel's critical lines into the context of the ugly duckling
myth, by the way, was no intrusion on my part. Johan de Mylius, in
the book I cited earlier, more than once reminds us of Brandes's
objection to Andersen's conclusion to "The Ugly Duckling." Instead
of ending up as the tame and hand-fed creature in the manor house's
pond, the young swan should have expressed an heroic and defiant
individualism by flying away in solitude and proud, exclusive
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suffering. 16 What Brandes is obviously missing in the text, as in so
many texts by Andersen, is a firm philosophy of life that could keep
under lid a disquieting lack of continuity and personality,
standpoints and engagement, as Mylius puts it.17
If the ugly duckling myth superficially served to reinforce the
supposedly modem critic Georg Brandes's view of himself as
someone in possession of the qualities just mentioned, then its
deeper significance lies in revealing Brandes's uneasiness about
ambiguousness and atomistic lack of central perspective, his restless
receptivity to impressions of change-in Andersen-that happened
to be far more central to the modem agenda than any of the
character traits Brandes himself laid claim to. 18

VI
I have argued elsewhere in some detail that what appears to be a
critical construction of Andersen by Brandes is rather a
reconstruction and deconstruction of received notions of the poet
and storyteller, both of which interventions prove indispensable for
Brandes's critical construction of himself. 19 So, instead of belaboring
this point I simply pose a question to Brandes' s overt
pronouncements about Andersen's !ability: Where did we hear
something like this before? Correct-from Kierkegaard, who
repeatedly objected to Andersen's "lack of an outlook." Mylius
rightly calls Brandes's critique of Andersen a "sort of a naturalistic
match to Kierkegaard's Bildung's-idealistic critique." 20 So it is, but it
is also a match to the fairy tale template-as Kierkegaard stamped it.
At the Gothenburg conference where Sven Rossel took issue with
Brandes's allegedly mythological self-portrait on the basis of a
variety of texts, Finn Hauberg Mortensen discussed persuasively
Brandes's 1877 book on Kierkegaard. Where Rossel queried whether
The Modem Breakthrough (but essentially Brandes himself) was
truly "modem," Mortensen puts the same question directly to one of
Brandes's pivotal texts. But unlike Rossel, Mortensen answers both
yes and no-and, in addition, he explains the connection between
the two. 21
On the one hand, Brandes adopts both Kirkegaard's critical
passion and passionate language and his demand for personal truth
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to which The Modem Breakthrough itself was strongly committed.
On the other hand, Brandes decouples these loans from their
contextual meaning in Kierkegaard's oeuvre.
Kierkegaard's
philosophy of personality and religiosity are conveniently passed
over in silence, and the antithetical trope that the younger critic has
also imported from his precursor basically serves him to distinguish
himself, as the mouthpiece of modernity, from Kierkegaard's
anachronism.
Even so, it turns out that Brandes's bourgeois affiliations were far
more centered on the idea of a unified personality than was the
period of split and doubled personalities to which Kierkegaard's
generation belonged. By adopting Kierkegaard selectively, so as to
warn The Modem Breakthrough against his paradoxical and
religious
temptations,
Brandes
simplified,
for
instance,
Kierkegaard's concept of personality to fit his modem audience; but
the complexity that he merely dispensed with, and didn't deal with,
in his Kierkegaardian source of inspiration, would later come back
to haunt its censor as an integral part of the modernism to which
he-Brandes-had even fewer attachments than Kierkegaard had.
The road to freedom thus turned out to be much less
straightforward than Brandes had anticipated. As Mortensen notes,
Brandes already in his Kierkegaard book finds people unexpectedly
impersonal and mass-oriented, and himself driven to thinking and
acting in lofty solitude. 22 His personal twisting of the ugly duckling
myth is back in force.
But, strictly speaking, so is Kierkegaard's take on the fairy tale.
Tales as search engines serving the ultimate search for selfhood were
precisely the driving forces Brandes could translate from the
philosopher-poet into his own modem breakthrough without
breaking the latter. Such orderly tales were comforting, unlike
Andersen's confusing multifariousness, but comforting only to the
point where divine intervention rendered the tales' self-realization
insufficient and where the course of the tales had to be altered by
Kierkegaard's own creation in order for their characters to meet their
creator.
At this point Brandes disembarks his reading-of Kierkegaard as
well as of Andersen-as no longer instrumental for his self-
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realization, and chooses instead self-imposition on his source of
inspiration as a shortcut to self-identification. And he does so at his
critical peril.
VII
The lesson to be learned from Georg Brandes's tales about Andersen
and Kierkegaard is this: even someone with a critical genius for
personality nuance both profits and suffers from casting his
observations in a totalizing view. While the art fairy tale at first
glance lends itself strongly to such a view-deep in its insight,
integrated in its world view and attitude-it also holds an abundance
of secrets that are relevant to the self-realization process despite the
surface impression this process may leave of an orderly cosmos.
Both Andersen and Kierkegaard realized as much and sought to
draw each their consequences thereof. For both of them, tales were
either liberating or had to be liberated.
Brandes, by contrast, believed he could enclose his liberal
individualism and psychological observation within the rationalist
and positivist dogmas of his time without having to pay the price for
the enclosure, i.e., without acknowledging that his pursuit of truth
must at some point be at the expense of the received order and
knowledge he also relished. Ignoring the conditions of possibility
for his critical endeavor, he increasingly substituted a mythical
fortification of insights he already possessed for the more risky fairy
tale mode of truth-seeking. This is not the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth about Brandes. But it is an important part
of it: that he rose like an open-ended fairy tale and set like a selfaffirming myth.
It's a pitfall that awaits us all.
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